Published
Navigating the 'Moral Hazard' Argument in Synthetic Biology's Application (2024)
Synthetic Biology
Synthetic biology has immense potential to ameliorate widespread environmental damage. The promise of such technology could, however, be argued to potentially risk the public, industry or governments not curtailing their environmentally damaging behavior or even worse exploit the possibility of this technology to do further damage. In such cases, there is the risk of a worse outcome than if the technology was not deployed. This risk is often couched as an objection to new technologies, that the technology produces a moral hazard. This paper describes how to navigate a moral hazard argument and mitigate the possibility of a moral hazard. Navigating moral hazard arguments and mitigating the possibility of a moral hazard will improve the public and environmental impact of synthetic biology
Synthetic Biology and the Goals of Conservation (2024)
Ethics, Policy, and Environment
The introduction of new genetic material into wild populations, using novel biotechnology, has the potential to fortify populations against existential threats, and, controversially, create wild genetically modified populations. The introduction of new genetic variation into populations, which will have an ongoing future in areas of conservation interest, complicates long-held values in conservation science and park management. I discuss and problematize, in light of genetic intervention, what I consider the three core goals of conservation science: biodiversity, ecosystem services, and wilderness. This uneasy relationship, however, does not forgo the use of such interventions. I argue there is a case for the application of this technology within some interpretations of the moral frameworks of wilderness and biodiversity.
The Evolution of Multispecies Populations: A Multilevel Perspective (2023)
Biology and Philosophy
Two or more independent species lineages can fuse through an evolutionary transition to form a single lineage, such as in the case of eukaryotic cells, lichens, and coral. The fusion of two or more independent lineages requires intermediary steps of increasing selective interdependence between these lineages. We argue a precursory selective regime of such a transition can be Multilevel Selection 1 (MLS1). We propose that intraspecies MLS1 can be extended to ecological multispecies arrangements. We develop a trait group selection (MLS1) model applicable to multispecies mutualistic interactions. We then explore conditions under which such a model could apply to mutualistic relationships between pollinators and plants. We propose that MLS1 could drive transitions towards higher interdependency between mutualists and stabilise obligate mutualisms in the face of invasion by cheater variants.
Community-Level Evolutionary Processes: Linking Community Genetic to Replicator-Interactior Theory (2022)
Proceedings to the National Academy of Sciences
Understanding community-level selection using Lewontin’s criteria requires both community-level inheritance and community-level heritability, and in the discipline of community and ecosystem genetics, these are often conflated. While there are existing studies that show the possibility of both, these studies impose community-level inheritance as a product of the experimental design. For this reason, these experiments provide only weak support for the existence of community-level selection in nature. By contrast, treating communities as interactors (in line with Hull’s replicator-interactor framework or Dawkins’s idea of the “extended phenotype”) provides a more plausible and empirically supportable model for the role of ecological communities in the evolutionary process.
Authenticy and Autonomy in De-Extinction (2022)
Ethics, Policy, and Environment
Eric Katz in Zombie Arguments defends the thesis authenticity is indispensable to conservation. I agree. However, I argue authenticity appears in degrees and can be reclaimed by populations through their continuing evolutionary responses to the world. This means that interventions that diminish the value of a population through reducing their authenticity can be permitted in limited cases. When our actions retain the remaining authentic features in a threatened population we should allow such a diminishment as authenticity can bereclaimed in time.
Invasive Species Increase Biodiversity and, Therefore, Services: An Argument of Equivocations (2021)
Conservation Science and Practice
Some critics of invasion biology have argued the invasion of ecosystems by non-indigenous species can create more valuable ecosystems. Invaded communities are proposed as more valuable because they potentially produce more ecosystem services. To establish that the introduction of non-indigenous species creates more valuable ecosystems they argue value is derived from ecosystem services. These services are a result of ecosystem productivity, the production and cycling of resources. Ecosystem productivity is a result of biodiversity, which is understood as local species richness. Invasive species increase local species richness and, therefore, increase the conservation value of local ecosystems. I reject this argument against controlling invasive species. Ecological systems are valuable for more than local productivity and biodiversity is not accurately described by a local species count.
Why Wake the Dead? Identity and De-extinction (2020)
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics
Invasive Species and Natural Function in Ecology (2020)
Synthese
If ecological systems are functionally organised, they can possess functions or malfunctions. Natural function would provide justification for conservationists to act for the protection of current ecological arrangements and control the presence of populations that act to create ecosystem malfunction. Invasive species are often thought to be malfunctional for ecosystems, so functional arrangement would provide an objective reason for their control. Unfortunately for this prospect, I argue no theory of function, which can support such normative conclusions, can be applied to large scale ecosystems. Instead ecological systems have causal structure, with small clusters of populations achieving functional arrangement. This, however, does not leave us without reason to control invasive species. We can look at the causal arrangement of ecological systems for populations that support ecological features that we should preserve. Populations that play a causal role in reducing biodiversity should be controlled, because biodiversity is a good all prudent agents should want to preserve.
General Unificatory Theories in Community Ecology (2019)
Philosophical Topics
.The question of whether there are laws of nature in ecology has developed substantially in the last 20 years. I argue much of the early scepticism towards ecology possessing laws was justified as they correctly identified ecology lacks a general unificatory theory. The lack of general theory still causes problems for explanation in ecology as there is no guidelines for how to integrate the local mathematical and causal models into a larger theory of how ecological assemblages are formed. Finally, I turn to a modern attempt to provide a unified higher-level explanation in ecology, presented by ecologist Mark Vellend, and advocate for philosophical engagement in its prospects for aiding ecological explanation.
Can Communities Cause? (2019)
Biology and Philosophy
Lynch et al. 2019 argue that many of the claims in microbiome research are ‘weak or misleading’ as these claims lack stability, specificity, or proportionality. In the final paragraph before the conclusion they entertain and rapidly dismiss the ‘ecological version’ of microbiomes, in which microbiome properties are emergent from their constituent populations and can fulfil Koch’s postulates. I assess the possibility of microbiomes having emergent causal efficacy on host health. [This is a commentary in reply to Lynch et al. 2019]
Indexically Structured Ecological Communities (2018)
Philosophy of Science
I argue instead of treating ecological communities as biological individuals we should represent them indexically. Identifying ecological communities via the network of weak causal interactions between populations that unfurl from a starting set of populations. This allows for a new robustness-focussed methodology for identifying communities based on a variety of properties important to researchers and stakeholders.
Biodiversity Realism: Preserving the Tree of Life (2017)
Biology and Philosophy
I defend the position that biodiversity should represent taxonomy and be quantified in reference to phylogenetic structure. I argue for biodiversity realism, which conceives of biodiversity as a natural quantity in the world which is measurable, valuable to prudential agents, and causally salient to ecological systems.
Biodiversity and Ecological Hierarchy (2016)
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Biodiversity [with Kim Sterelny]
Biodiversity should measure biological natural kinds. We argue that ecological communities are not apt for being included with biodiversity assessment. Ecological dynamics are best considered at the taxonomic level and at the level of biogeographic regions. We must look at these levels when measuring biodiversity.
The Value of Phylogenetic Diversity (2016)
Biodiversity Conservation and Phylogenetic Systematics [with James Maclaurin]
This is the opening chapter of a scientific book. We introduce the theory around Phylogenetic Diversity and argue that it is a particularly valuable way to assess biodiversity. We outline justifications for biodiversity’s value and the problems associated with overly permissive accounts of what features contribute to biodiversity.
The Evolution of Failure: Explaining Cancer as an Evolutionary Process (2016)
Biology and Philosophy [with Anya Plutynki]
Cancer is often modelled as if it were a population of single cell organisms undergoing natural selection. This is flawed as cancer involves the co-ordination and integration of cells in a tumour, which mirror aspects of the major transitions in evolution. This necessitates a multilevel selection view of cancer progression.
Under Review
Thesis
Ecological Kinds and the Units of Conservation
Conservation has often been conducted with the implicit internalization of Aldo Leopold’s claim: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community.” This has been found to be problematic as ecological science has not vindicated the ecological community as an entity which can be stable or possess integrity or even cohere sufficiently to allow for induction. Ecological communities do not form natural kinds and this has forced ecological scientists to explain ecology in a different manner. Individualist approaches to ecological systems have gained prominence. Individualists claim that ecological systems are better explained at the population level rather than as whole communities. My thesis looks at the implications of the current state of ecological science on conservation biology and emphasizes the importance of biodiversity as assessed at the population level. I defend the position that biodiversity should represent taxonomy and be quantified in reference to phylogenetic structure. This is a defense of biodiversity realism, which conceives of biodiversity as a natural quantity in the world which is measurable, valuable to prudential agents, and causally salient to ecological systems. To address how biodiversity at the population level relates to larger ecological systems I create a methodology designed to identify the relevant ecological system which biodiversity maintains and is maintained by. This is done through the context dependent modelling of causal networks indexed to populations. My causal modelling methodology is then utilized to explicate ecological functions. These chapters together provide a framework for conservation science which can then be applied to novel problems. The final sections of the thesis utilize this framework to address whether de-extinction is a worthwhile conservation technique and whether we should treat holobionts as ecological communities or evolutionary individuals.
Conservation has often been conducted with the implicit internalization of Aldo Leopold’s claim: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community.” This has been found to be problematic as ecological science has not vindicated the ecological community as an entity which can be stable or possess integrity or even cohere sufficiently to allow for induction. Ecological communities do not form natural kinds and this has forced ecological scientists to explain ecology in a different manner. Individualist approaches to ecological systems have gained prominence. Individualists claim that ecological systems are better explained at the population level rather than as whole communities. My thesis looks at the implications of the current state of ecological science on conservation biology and emphasizes the importance of biodiversity as assessed at the population level. I defend the position that biodiversity should represent taxonomy and be quantified in reference to phylogenetic structure. This is a defense of biodiversity realism, which conceives of biodiversity as a natural quantity in the world which is measurable, valuable to prudential agents, and causally salient to ecological systems. To address how biodiversity at the population level relates to larger ecological systems I create a methodology designed to identify the relevant ecological system which biodiversity maintains and is maintained by. This is done through the context dependent modelling of causal networks indexed to populations. My causal modelling methodology is then utilized to explicate ecological functions. These chapters together provide a framework for conservation science which can then be applied to novel problems. The final sections of the thesis utilize this framework to address whether de-extinction is a worthwhile conservation technique and whether we should treat holobionts as ecological communities or evolutionary individuals.
